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According to the Book of Common Prayer, we have sinned against God “in 
thought, word, and deed.” In this paper I’ll explore one way of understand-
ing what it might mean to sin against God in thought—the idea that we can at 
least potentially wrong God by what we believe. I will be interested in the phil-
osophical tenability of this idea, and particularly in its potential consequences 
for the epistemology of religious belief and the problem of evil.
According to the formulation of the Christian confession in the Book of 
Common Prayer, we have sinned against God “in thought, word, and 
deed.” In this paper I’ll explore one way of understanding what it might 
mean to sin against God in thought and what might constitute such sin-
ning—the idea that we can at least potentially wrong God by what we 
believe. There are other natural interpretations of what it might mean to 
sin against God in thought, and I will not have anything to say against 
them, here. My sole interest will be in whether among the ways in which 
it might be possible to sin against God in thought, is to have beliefs which 
instantiate directed wrongs against God. I will be interested in the phil-
osophical tenability of this idea more than in its doctrinal tenability, and 
particularly in its potential consequences for the epistemology of religious 
belief and the problem of evil.
1. Background – Sins of Thought
Thought is a very broad category, and so there are correspondingly many 
possible interpretations of what might constitute sins of thought. Desires 
are mental states, and in the very broadest sense, “thought” is a word for 
mental states, so it follows that desires may be thoughts, at least in this 
very broad sense. So among the sins of thought might be unwholesome or 
repellant desires—covetous, spiteful, or vindictive desires, whether or not 
we act on them. Patterns of attention are also, even more obviously, a form 
of thought. If you occupy your attention with repeatedly imaginatively 
rehearsing endless variations on taking down a rival or unerringly imag-
inatively undress a colleague while discussing philosophy, then you are 
doing something deeply wrong, even if you never act and would never 
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act on these fantasies. These are wrongs, they are wrongs of thought, 
they are important wrongs, and I have no doubt that they are among the 
chief wrongs the authors of the confession had in mind when selecting 
these words.
But the question that I will be interested in—one that is prompted, but 
by no means forced, by the formulation of the confession—is whether the 
sins of thought may also involve doxastic wrongs. By doxastic wrongs, 
I mean wrongs in virtue of the doxastic states of belief or doubt.1 Doxastic 
wrongs against God might include, for example, doubt or outright disbe-
lief, or other beliefs about God or about the consequences of God’s Works 
that somehow wrong Them. My question is whether, if we can wrong one 
another by what we believe about each other, we might not also be in a 
position to wrong God by our beliefs.
There has been very little discussion in analytic philosophy and the 
history of moral philosophy about the possibility that we can wrong one 
another in virtue of our beliefs about them, as opposed to in virtue of 
what we do before forming a belief, or after forming it. Indeed, philoso-
phers often go quite far out of their way to avoid attributing wrongness 
to beliefs themselves—presumably because they take themselves to have 
good arguments that beliefs are not the right kind of thing to be morally 
wrong. I’ll return to consider such challenges in section 2.
But for now I’ll simply note that outside of philosophy, the idea that 
beliefs can wrong, and can be wrong, is often not considered absurd. 
Racists and sexists, for example, are naïvely held to hold beliefs that are 
not just false, but wrong.2 Indeed, this commonplace idea about racism and 
sexism is central enough that it plausibly plays a role in preventing people 
from recognizing ways in which racism or sexism can be manifested that 
go beyond beliefs. But it is also prima facie plausible that we can wrong one 
another as individuals by what we believe about one another.
Suppose, for example, that after several unsuccessful attempts to get over 
my alcohol problem, I have now been sober for several months.3 Tonight 
I  manage to stay away from drinking even after the visiting colloquium 
speaker spills wine on my arm, forcing me to smell alcohol for the whole 
evening, so it is my greatest achievement yet. But when I get home, my wife 
smells the alcohol on me and concludes that I have fallen off of the wagon. 
If I see the look in her eye, I will rightly be upset—her belief wrongs me.
You might doubt my description of this example. Indeed, as I’ve already 
noted, most analytic philosophers will go far out of their way to avoid 
1This is very close, I take it, to what Robert Adams means by “cognitive sins” (Adams, 
“Involuntary Sins”). Despite self-consciously using the word “sin” and appealing to a bibli-
cal text as his motivating thought, Adams defines sin for his purposes in terms of appropri-
ate blame, and hence in a way that is not directional, as the concept of wronging that interests 
me in this paper.
2Again, compare to Adams, “Involuntary Sins,” 19.
3This example and the term “doxastic wrong” come from Basu and Schroeder, “Doxastic 
Wronging.”
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accepting this, I think obvious, truth. But one surefire way to tell that it 
is the belief that wrongs me, and not the look in her eye or the care she 
took in forming the belief, is that I will not be satisfied if she apologizes 
for what she did after forming the belief, such as giving it away with that 
look in her eye, and what she did before forming the belief, such as the 
care that she took in forming it, without apologizing for her belief itself. 
What bothers me, is the way that her estimation of the situation brings me 
down—the way in which it minimizes my achievement. Since apologizing 
for everything else does not suffice for moral repair, the belief itself must 
be among the wrongs.
But if beliefs can wrong others, then maybe they can also wrong God. 
Indeed, this is the claim that I will be endeavoring to make plausible in 
the remainder of this paper. In the language of the confession, we can sin 
against God in thought. The relationship between sin and wrongs is com-
plex, and I will have little to say about it. On one view, sins are nothing 
over and above morally wrong actions, and so sins against God are noth-
ing over and above directed wrongs against God. On another view, there 
is more to the nature of sin than that it consists in morally wrong action, 
but whenever an action is morally wrong, it is a sin—so similarly, when-
ever an act wrongs God it is a sin against God. And on a third view, not all 
morally wrong actions are sins, but any sin must be a wrong, and corre-
spondingly any sin against God must be a wrong against God. All three of 
these views make room for a close relationship between my thesis that we 
can commit doxastic wrongs against God and the terms of the confession. 
I will not decide between these views here.
On other views about sin, the connection between my conclusion in 
this paper and the terms of the confession will be less close. For example, 
on one view, there is no distinction between sins and sins against God—
all sins are sins against God. On this view, we would not need to wrong 
God by our beliefs, in order for some of the sins of thought catalogued 
by the confession to be doxastic wrongs—even wronging one another by 
what we believe about them could count. This and other possible views 
about sin may make the implications of my primary conclusion out to be 
less close to the proper interpretation of this particular formulation of the 
confession than my first paragraph made out. That is fine with me; the 
confession is just one way in to seeing the interest of my question, and we 
will see in what follows that there are others.
2. Reasons to be Skeptical
There are both philosophical and theological reasons to doubt whether we 
can wrong God by what we believe about Them. The theological reasons 
for doubt consist in reasons to doubt that we can wrong God at all, whereas 
the philosophical reasons for doubt consist in reasons to doubt that beliefs 
can wrong at all. Let’s take the theological reasons for skepticism first.
Plausibly the best theological reason to think that we cannot wrong 
God is that God is so great that They are beyond our capacity to wrong. 
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If this is correct, then all talk about “sins against” God needs to be inter-
preted carefully so as to avoid the implication that we could somehow 
actually wrong God. Maybe all sins are sins “against God,” even if they do 
not wrong God in any way, but only wrong other people.
I suggest that this inference relies essentially on the mistaken assump-
tion that all wrongs must involve or entail harms. It is highly plausible 
that God, at least as conceived of by traditional Theism, is so great that 
They cannot be harmed—by anyone, let alone by miniscule and imperfect 
beings such as ourselves. It is true that many moral views allow that it 
is possible to wrong someone only by harming them in some way. But 
I think that this is a mistake that may safely be set aside. It is much more 
obvious that it wrongs someone to fail to keep a trivial and easily kept 
deathbed promise to them, than that it harms them. Attempts to explain 
this wrong in terms of posthumous harms are more controversial than 
what they are trying to explain.
Indeed, we can use deathbed promises to argue against the necessity of 
harms for wrongs directly. Suppose that your parent is a famous and influ-
ential author, and having designated you as their literary executor, asks 
you to promise to destroy their greatest, nearly finished, novel after their 
death. If you so promise, but fail to do so, then you wrong them—they had 
a right that you follow through and destroy their work, which you failed 
to respect.4 But you don’t harm them. To resist this argument by insisting 
otherwise is to assume that no one can have a right to act in ways that 
harm themselves. For if anyone at all has a right to act in ways that harm 
themselves, then they can have a right to ask of you, that you do so—at 
least within bounds. And if you thereby promise to do so, then they have 
a right against you, that you do it. And if you violate that right, then you 
wrong them. So you can wrong someone by doing something that does 
not harm them—indeed, by doing something that even benefits them, as 
the deathbed novelist case illustrates.
Not only should we grant that it is possible to wrong someone with-
out also harming them, cases of doxastic wrongs are particularly likely 
to include such harms. This is because, since it is highly controversial 
whether beliefs can wrong anyone at all, any putative examples of beliefs 
that wrong will be explained away by critics in terms of the upstream 
wrongs associated with the process of forming the belief, or with the 
downstream effects of the belief. So the only forcefully compelling exam-
ples of beliefs that wrong will be beliefs that never actually have those 
downstream consequences, or where the downstream consequences are 
apologized for but this still doesn’t seem to speak to the wrong itself. In 
other words, cases like my falling off the wagon, from section 1. In all such 
cases, doxastic wrongs will be paradigms of wrongs that do not involve 
harms, or whose wrongfulness exceeds the significance of the associated 
4This gloss on the case assumes that violating someone’s right wrongs them. But I won’t 
assume that wronging someone requires violating one of their rights.
277SINS OF THOUGHT
harms. So if there are doxastic wrongs at all, the best examples of them 
are particularly likely not to involve harms, and hence it should be no 
surprise if it turns out that it is possible to wrong God through belief, even 
if it is not possible to harm Them in any way.
So much for at least one obvious theological reason to doubt whether 
we can wrong God in virtue of our beliefs. In this paper, as I’ve said, I’m 
more concerned with the philosophical merits of this thesis. And there are 
also ample philosophical grounds to doubt it. In particular, many epis-
temologists have doubted whether we have sufficient control over our 
beliefs for it to turn out that there are any beliefs that we ought to have 
at all, even in some restricted epistemic sense of “ought.” If whether there 
is anything we ought or ought not to believe can be cast into doubt even 
setting moral wrongness aside, it will be no wonder if philosophers are 
especially shy about attributing moral wrongness to beliefs.
This objection becomes particularly forceful once we consider some 
of the most promising answers to why there can be some things that we 
ought, or ought not, to believe, despite our lack of any ability to believe, 
in Bernard Williams’s terms, “at will.” For example, Nishi Shah points out 
that to believe at will is to believe what you intend to believe.5 So to be able 
to believe at will would be for our intentions to be able to control out beliefs. 
But there can be things that we ought to intend even if our intentions are 
not in control of our intentions, so this condition is clearly too strong. What 
is much more plausible, is that in order for an “ought” to apply to beliefs, 
that “ought” must derive from reasons to which our beliefs are actually 
sensitive. Yet our beliefs are sensitive to the evidence. And evidence is rea-
son to believe par excellence. So insofar as what we epistemically ought to 
believe is derived from the evidence, we have exactly the right sort of con-
trol over our beliefs in order for such oughts to apply to us.
Yet if this is the best sort of answer to why we do have the right sort of 
control over what we believe for there to be things that we ought or ought 
not to believe, that might make us only more skeptical of whether there 
are any things that it is morally wrong to believe. For though it is highly 
plausible that our beliefs are sensitive to the evidence, it is much less plau-
sible that our beliefs are sensitive to just any old moral consideration—for 
example, learning that it would be utility-maximizing to believe some-
thing is not the right sort of thing to convince us that it is true.
This is a very important challenge. But my answer to this challenge is 
that our beliefs are, in fact, sensitive to the right kinds of moral consider-
ations. Not to the moral benefits of beliefs, but to the moral costs of error. 
It would wrong your spouse to mistakenly believe that he has fallen off 
of the wagon if in fact he has managed to stay sober despite adverse cir-
cumstances. Knowing that the stakes are high because this belief would 
malign him if it were false doesn’t just require us, but also makes it possible 
for us, to hold out for better evidence, before jumping to that conclusion. 
5Shah, “How Truth Governs Belief” and “A New Argument for Evidentialism.”
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Similarly, if some beliefs would wrong God if they were falsely held, we 
are perfectly capable of taking more care—of holding ourselves to higher 
evidential standards—before coming to accept those answers. So if sensi-
tivity to the reasons that go into determining an ought is all that is required 
for that ought to apply to us, then I  see no reason why there cannot be 
moral oughts governing belief that apply to us, so long as they are con-
strained to only depend on such reasons.
A quite different source of philosophical doubt concerning my thesis 
that it may be possible to commit doxastic wrongs against God is more 
general. It is that our best traditional moral theories concern actions, rather 
than beliefs or other attitudes. So beliefs cannot wrong at all, let  alone 
wrong God, because this is inconsistent with our best moral theories. 
There is something to be said for this objection, because it is true that at 
least some traditional moral theorizing does takes for granted that actions 
are the relevant target of evaluation. But so far from being a problem for 
the idea that there can be doxastic wrongs, I suggest that this merely casts 
theories that can make no room for doxastic wrongs into doubt.
But more importantly, I want to suggest, in fact there is ample room 
for the idea that beliefs can wrong in many familiar frameworks from the 
history of moral theorizing. Instead of looking to what theorists do talk 
about, we should look to what their theories can make sense of. And if we 
look carefully in this way, I suggest that we can make sense of this idea in 
Aristotelian terms, in Kantian terms, and even in consequentialist terms. 
Aristotle’s ethics, after all, is full of discussion of intellectual virtues, and 
what it essentially requires is simply that we desire the right things to the 
right degree. If desiring more strongly not to malign my character can lead 
you to hold out for more evidence before concluding something negative 
about me, then some beliefs about others will be beliefs that reflect vir-
tue—or at least are in accordance with virtue—while others are not.
Similarly, Kant’s ethics is deeply rooted in the idea that ethical conduct 
is fundamentally a matter of non-exceptionalism. It is just as important, 
on this picture, that you recognize others as moral equals as it is that you 
act only on maxims that you prescribe for them as well. You don’t need 
to universalize your maxims to rocks or to squirrels, but only to rational 
agents. And so acting on a maxim that you do not prescribe to someone 
else and believing that they are not a rational agent are fundamentally 
very close to amounting to the same thing. So on a very natural way of 
taking Kant, wrongful action in general can be identified with or grounded 
in wrongful belief.6
And finally, consequentialism may seem to be the greatest challenge for 
the idea that beliefs themselves can wrong. After all, on the most familiar 
articulations of consequentialism, including utilitarianism, actions must 
wrong through their effects, and my most direct arguments in favor of the 
thesis that beliefs can wrong proceed through cases in which we have 
6Special thanks for discussion to Matthew Lyskawa and Samantha Matherne.
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tried to screen off the harmful effects of wrongful beliefs. Still, there is no 
obstacle at all to consequentialists accepting that beliefs themselves can 
wrong. Whether they do or not is simply a question of whether the ulti-
mate list of bads includes some kinds of beliefs.
So the idea that beliefs can wrong makes sense on rights-based 
approaches to ethical theory, and it can be accommodated on many views 
which tie morality to the significance of our attitudes toward one another. 
I conclude once more that there is no insurmountable objection, here, to 
the idea that we could wrong God by what we believe about Them.
3. Moral Encroachment
A quite different reason to be worried about whether beliefs can wrong 
comes from the worry that if they do, then there will be conflicts between 
morality and epistemic rationality—cases where the only rational course 
is to do something wrong, and the only moral course is to do something 
irrational. Such conflicts, if they existed, would leave us having to make 
hard choices between being rational, and being good. More generally, the 
fact that a belief is well-enough supported to be knowledge seems like it 
should be a pretty good answer to any moral objection. And even things to 
which there are moral objections are not really wrong, if those objections 
have good enough answers.
Much more is required in order to make this objection as forceful as it 
can be—more than I can develop, here. But I believe that this objection 
requires an answer. And the answer, I believe, is that there will be no con-
flicts at all between epistemic rationality and moral requirements, so long 
as the two are harmonious. But harmony between the moral and epistemic 
requirements governing belief comes with a choice: either this harmony is 
guaranteed because the matter of which beliefs wrong is always restricted 
to the independent matter of which beliefs are epistemically irrational, or 
it is guaranteed, at least in part, because whether a belief might wrong can 
affect whether it is epistemically irrational. The latter fork of this choice 
is the possibility that there is moral encroachment on the epistemic ration-
ality of belief—a special case of what has come to be known as pragmatic 
encroachment in epistemology.7
It is therefore possible that there could be beliefs that wrong even with-
out conflicts between moral and epistemic norms, and even without prag-
matic encroachment on the epistemic rationality of belief. But this would be 
7Early advocates of pragmatic encroachment in the contemporary landscape include 
Fantl and McGrath, “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification” and Knowledge in an Uncertain 
World, Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, and Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests. 
The specific version of pragmatic encroachment that I  defend is developed in Ross and 
Schroeder, “Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment,” and in Schroeder, “Stakes, 
Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment,” “The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons,” “What 
Makes Reasons Sufficient?,” “Rational Stability under Pragmatic Encroachment,” and more 
systematically in Reasons First. The argument in this section is a condensation from Basu and 
Schroeder, “Doxastic Wronging.”
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substantially less interesting. In order to preserve the harmony between moral 
and epistemic norms without allowing for pragmatic encroachment, beliefs 
that wrong must be restricted to beliefs that are independently epistemically 
irrational. But that means that even if some beliefs do wrong, we can never 
learn anything new about which beliefs are criticizable by learning which beliefs 
wrong—we can only learn more about which criticisms they are subject to.
If this possibility is correct, then when my wife smells the alcohol on 
my clothes and concludes that I have fallen off of the wagon—applying 
the very same standard of evidence that she would apply to whether it is 
likely to rain tomorrow, based on the forecast—she cannot have wronged 
me in any way.8 And even if I feel hurt, she should owe me no apology 
if she can demonstrate that her reasoning is impartially rational in this 
way. Similarly, if this possibility is correct, and some of our beliefs wrong 
God, then when we confess to sinning against God in thought, we are con-
fessing to being epistemically irrational in ways that have nothing to do 
with God, and only to do how we assess evidence. I conclude that if there 
are to be interesting and substantial doxastic wrongs—wrongs of belief—
either against God or against one another, then in order for the moral and 
epistemic norms governing belief to be in harmony, there must be moral 
encroachment on the epistemic rationality of belief.
4. Pragmatic Intellectualism
How, then, can we reconcile the thesis that there is moral encroachment on 
the epistemic rationality of belief with the compelling orthodox idea that 
what it is rational to believe depends only on your evidence or on other 
truth-related factors? Well, according to standard formulations of eviden-
tialism, what it is epistemically rational to believe depends only on what 
is supported by adequate evidence. This makes it seem like evidence is all 
that matters for epistemic rationality. But a lot is covered up by the word 
“adequate.” If whether evidence is adequate depends on moral or other 
pragmatic features of the situation, then evidentialism in this sense is true, 
but there is still moral or more generally pragmatic encroachment on the 
epistemic rationality of belief, or even on knowledge.
According to the form of pragmatic encroachment that I favor, which 
I  call pragmatic intellectualism, the fact that it is epistemically rational to 
believe something just in case it is supported by adequate evidence fol-
lows from the more general principle that it is rational to do anything just 
in case it is supported by adequate reasons, together with the fact that 
the only properly epistemic reasons for belief are evidence.9 Reasons are 
8It is of course possible that the evidential standards vary between topics such as the 
weather and spouses without this variation depending on what is morally or pragmatically 
at stake. If so, then this point needs to be put with a different comparative example—but so 
long as the variation in standards is not driven by moral or pragmatic considerations, there 
will always be some such example to drive it.
9Schroeder, “Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment,” “The Ubiquity of State-
Given Reasons,” “What Makes Reasons Sufficient?,” and Reasons First.
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adequate, in turn, roughly speaking just in case they beat all comers—or 
more carefully and precisely, just in case the reasons in favor of something 
are at least as good as the reasons against it. So, for example, with respect to 
action, an action is rational just in case the reasons that favor it are at least 
as good as the reasons against it (and not otherwise), and similarly, with 
respect to belief, a belief is epistemically rational just in case the epistemic 
reasons that favor it are at least as good as the epistemic reasons against it.
Now, I  have said that evidence is the only kind of epistemic reason 
in favor of belief. If evidence were also the only kind of epistemic rea-
son against belief, then it would follow that it is epistemically rational to 
believe something just in case the evidence in favor of its content is at least 
as good as the evidence against it. But this is false—when the evidence 
is tied, typically the only rational course is to remain agnostic. Indeed, 
its falsity is the main reason why many philosophers have been led to 
believe that the epistemic rationality of belief must be a very different kind 
of thing from the practical rationality of action.10 But rather than leading 
us to conclude that the epistemic rationality of belief is so different from 
the practical rationality of action, I think it should instead lead us to con-
clude that evidence is not, after all, the only kind of epistemic reason 
against belief.
Indeed, given that believing that ~p is not the negation of believing 
that p, because we always have the third option of having neither belief, 
it would be quite surprising indeed if the only reasons against believing 
that p are the reasons to believe that ~p. Yet this is what would be true, if 
the only epistemic reasons against believing that p are the evidence that 
~p. Since the question of what to believe always has a tripartite structure, 
therefore, while the question of whether to act always has only a bipartite 
structure, we should expect there to be epistemic reasons against belief that 
are not evidence against its content.
Indeed, there are quite promising candidates for epistemic reasons 
against belief that are not evidence. For example, all of us form beliefs 
about philosophical questions and about matters of ancient history on 
the basis of paltry evidence—evidence that would never suffice to form a 
belief about how many people are in the next room. If you had the same 
quality of evidence about how many people are in the room next door 
as you have about your favorite philosophical theory, you would never 
believe on that basis—and indeed, it would be epistemically irresponsi-
ble for you to do so. The reason that it would be irresponsible is not that 
your evidence does not support one conclusion over the others, but rather 
that it is so meager in comparison to the much more decisive evidence 
that you could so easily come by, by simply looking around the corner. 
Despite being a fact about evidence, the fact that you could easily come 
by much more decisive evidence about how many people are in the room 
next door is not itself evidence against your hunch about how many are in 
10Compare Harman, “Practical Aspects of Theoretical Reasoning.”
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the room—but it does raise the bar for how good your evidence must be 
in order to believe without it. This explains why it is sometimes rational to 
believe things about philosophy and paleozoology.11
I conclude that it is not so strange, after all, to think that there are epis-
temic reasons against belief that are not evidence for or against the content 
of that belief. Indeed, the other most natural though much more controver-
sial example of such reasons are broadly speaking pragmatic—concerning 
the costs of error. If you believe falsely that you have no allergy to penicil-
lin, you expose yourself to great harms. These harms, moreover, are not 
incidental to the nature of belief—like if an evil demon threatens to punish 
you if you falsely believe that you have an allergy to penicillin.12 Rather, 
they flow from the belief doing its job correctly. If it does its job correctly, 
then you will take it for granted, in most situations or at least by default, 
that you are not allergic to penicillin, and hence you may accept penicillin 
as an antibiotic when you are suffering from a bacterial infection or sus-
pected bacterial infection. If this belief is false, then this will have drastic 
consequences, since allergic reactions to penicillin can be quite severe. In 
a slogan, the stakes for believing that you have no allergy to penicillin are 
high.13 You should only believe this on the basis of good evidence.
As with the availability of further evidence, moreover, it is not mys-
terious how we can respond to such stakes-related reasons. When your 
spouse reminds you that your mortgage payment is due over the week-
end and your balance is low, you will find it easy to double-check your 
evidence that the bank will be open on Saturday, before driving home to 
avoid the long line on Friday afternoon.14 And if you love someone, you 
will give them the benefit of the doubt—literally, you will doubt negative 
conclusions about them under circumstances that you would not doubt 
predictions about the weather.15
So Pragmatic Intellectualism, I  suggest, makes room for the possibil-
ity of doxastic wrongs—beliefs by which we can wrong one another, and 
by extension, possibly, God—without creating any tension with epistemic 
rationality. If Pragmatic Intellectualism is true, then among the costs of 
some false beliefs may be that such a belief, if false, would wrong some-
one. When this is so, the stakes for rationally believing that claim will be 
higher, and it will be harder to know, even if it is true.
5. Is It True?
So far I’ve been trying to explain how Pragmatic Intellectualism makes 
room for the possibility of doxastic wrongs. But is it true? We can trian-
gulate on the existence of these epistemic reasons against belief, I believe, 
11Schroeder, “The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.”
12Ross and Schroeder, “Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.”
13Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests.
14DeRose, “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.”
15Keller, “Friendship and Belief”; Stroud, “Epistemic Partiality in Friendship.”
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in several ways. We can argue for them by observing that the existence of 
these reasons would explain the difference between what it is epistemi-
cally rational to believe about paleozoology and about how many people 
are in the next room, and that they would explain the difference between 
what it is epistemically rational to believe about the weather, and what it 
is epistemically rational to believe about whether you are allergic to pen-
icillin. This form of argument is fine so far as it goes—indeed, I believe 
that it is sound—but since both of these claims about what is epistemi-
cally rational—particularly the one that I have made about the penicillin 
allergy—are contentious, it is not dialectically effective.
Second, we can argue for the existence of epistemic reasons against 
belief by seeing how our actual belief practices are sensitive to them in 
ways that are characteristic of how we are responsive to actual reasons 
for and against belief and other attitudes. For example, just as you can 
become convinced that your friend will come to the party by her telling 
you that she will, you can become convinced to withhold for now on 
whether your friend will come to the party by learning that she has just 
sent her RSVP, which you have not yet opened. Similarly, just as you can 
become convinced that someone won’t win the soccer tryouts by watch-
ing him play goalie, you can be convinced (in marginal cases) to withhold 
until soccer tryouts are over if you are reminded how much being good 
enough to make the soccer team means to his self-conception.16
But the most helpful and systematic way to argue for the existence of 
these kinds of epistemic reason against belief is to show why it flows from 
a general account of the nature of epistemic reasons, that there must be 
such reasons. This is important, because the most important and common 
reason for doubting that there could be such non-evidential epistemic rea-
sons against belief, is the naïve idea that the distinction between epistemic 
and non-epistemic reasons just is the distinction between evidence and 
other reasons. Some philosophers even propose that this is a matter of stip-
ulation. But although people can use the word “epistemic” stipulatively 
however they like, we should be doubtful whether this is an interesting 
use of “epistemic.” I propose that we restrict “epistemic reason” to those 
reasons that bear on the strongest kind of rationality entailed by knowl-
edge.17 On this use, it is a substantive matter, rather than a stipulative one, 
whether there are non-evidential epistemic reasons. And those who hold 
that there are none should have no complaints about using “epistemic” in 
this way, because they can still identify what is false about the thesis that 
there are such reasons.
Since it is a substantive matter whether there are non-evidential epis-
temic reasons, we can investigate it by looking into the nature of the “epis-
temic”/”non-epistemic” distinction more generally. And here I  suggest 
16Compare Schroeder, “The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.”
17I argue in more detail for the helpfulness of this proposal in Schroeder, “What Makes 
Reasons Sufficient?”
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that this distinction is on a par with similar distinctions that we can draw 
for every other attitude. There are distinctive conditions governing the 
rationality of intention, fear, hope, admiration, and awe, and being offered 
money if one does, or having one’s family threatened if one does not, have 
one of these attitudes, is not the right kind of thing to make them distinc-
tively rational in the manner appropriate to each of these attitudes. On 
the contrary, benefits of action, dangers, advantages, excellence, and rare 
achievement, are each the kinds of thing to make these attitudes distinc-
tively rational. So I propose that the question of which the right kind of 
reasons are to make belief rational, should be delegated to the question of 
what makes reasons the right kind for attitudes in general, together with 
the answer to what makes belief different from other attitudes.
In all of these cases, I believe, the right kinds of reasons for each atti-
tude concern its proper function. Reasons to intend come from benefits 
of performing the intended action, because the function of intention is to 
coordinate action over time. Similarly, the availability of further evidence 
is a reason against intention, because given the function of intention in 
coordinating action over time, it is evidence that this decision could be 
better coordinated at a later decision time. Similarly, dangers are reasons 
to fear, because the job of fear is to cultivate alertness and avoidance—and 
so on for each of the other attitudes.18
But I suggest, and have argued at length elsewhere, that the job of belief 
is to allow us to settle some questions in order to be able to rely on their 
answers by default in further reasoning and action.19 This explains why we 
should expect evidence to matter for belief—beliefs formed without evi-
dence will not represent our best efforts to secure the truth. It also explains 
why we should expect the availability of further evidence to matter, for 
beliefs formed when much better evidence is easily available will be set-
tled at a disadvantageous time. And finally, it explains why we should 
expect the potential costs of error to matter for belief formation, because in 
disposing us to rely on some claim by default, belief exposes us to the risk 
of our actions having bad consequences, if the information that we rely 
on is mistaken—and worse consequences, if the costs of error are higher. 
A good believer, therefore, should form beliefs when the evidence is best, 
and be reluctant to form beliefs that carry high risks associated with error.
Although there is much more to be said about every point made so 
far, I conclude that there are excellent independent reasons to expect the 
contours of epistemic rationality to match those laid out by Pragmatic 
Intellectualism. Consequently, I believe that we should take seriously both 
the idea that some beliefs may wrong, and that whenever beliefs carry 
risks of wronging, this raises the standards both for epistemically rational 
belief, and consequently for knowledge.
18Schroeder, Reasons First.




So far, I’ve said nothing about which sorts of beliefs wrong. But the most 
plausible cases of beliefs that wrong other human beings are beliefs that 
falsely assign less positive agency to them than they really possess—a 
thought that I’ll gloss by saying that they “diminish positive agency.” So to 
say that a belief diminishes someone’s positive agency is not to say that it 
prevents or hinders them from acting positively—that, after all, would turn 
on the downstream effects of the belief and I am throughout assuming that 
wrongfulness of beliefs cannot turn on their harmful effects. Rather, it means 
simply that the belief constitutes an underestimate of someone’s positive 
agency.20
If my wife compliments my gardening, and I falsely conclude that some-
thing nice must have happened to her at work that day, to put her in such 
a good mood, my belief wrongs her—it brings her down, diminishing her 
capacity to make a positive contribution to our relationship.21 Similarly, if 
your friend is trying to quite smoking and you assume, in accordance with 
the statistical evidence, that he will fail, your belief brings him down—it 
diminishes his positive agency in the world. And as a result, if he turns out 
to succeed, making your belief false, then you will have wronged him.22
It is important, I think, that the right account of which beliefs wrong is 
evaluatively laden in this way. It does not wrong your friend to falsely 
believe that he is capable of making the soccer team, or that he didn’t 
commit the crime. But it does wrong your friend to falsely believe that he 
is incapable of making the team, or that he did commit it. But the question 
of which beliefs wrong cannot be exhausted by any simple positive/
negative assessment, either. The belief that someone is good at math just 
because they have a Chinese last name, for example, can wrong even 
though it seems positive. The reason that it does so, I conjecture, is that 
it diminishes her agency—her own responsibility for her ability at math, 
relegating it to the causal background of the influence of race or culture.
So far, we’re looking at intuitive judgments of which cases of false 
beliefs are plausible examples of doxastic wrongs. But the question of 
which beliefs wrong is also fruitfully constrained by the commitments of 
my defense of the possibility of doxastic wrongs. According to my defense, 
part of what opens up the possibility of doxastic wrongs is that the moral 
and epistemic norms governing belief don’t actually pull apart, because 
of Pragmatic Intellectualism’s thesis that costs of error raise the standards 
for the epistemic rationality of belief, and wronging someone is a relevant 
kind of cost of error.
Of course, it is important for my defense of Pragmatic Intellectualism 
that not all costs of false belief matter, but only costs that accrue through 
the normal functioning of belief. So someone can raise the stakes for you by 
20Schroeder, “When Beliefs Wrong.”
21Schroeder, “Persons as Things.”
22Compare Marusic, Evidence and Agency.
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offering you a wager, for example, but she cannot raise the stakes for you 
by threatening to punish your family if you believe something falsely. This 
means that wrongful beliefs must be wrongful because of the normal role 
that beliefs play—because of what makes them beliefs—rather than because 
of their consequences more generally. But beliefs that falsely diminish some-
one’s positive agency in the world are precisely the beliefs that, when they 
function in the normal way, will affect how you relate to them as an agent.
So I believe that the cases in which we wrong people like ourselves by 
what we believe about them are all cases in which those beliefs dimin-
ish their positive agency in the world—beliefs that make them out to be 
less, or worse, or more a product of circumstances than they really are. 
Negative beliefs about friends, as discussed by Keller and Stroud,23 the 
belief that you or a friend will fail at some task, as discussed by Marusic,24 
the belief that some major accomplishment of your own was actually a 
mistake, as I discuss elsewhere,25 and others all fit into this category. Much 
more could be said to make this idea precise, but those refinements are 
I think orthogonal to the main lessons that I want to draw from this idea.
7. The Problem of Evil
If beliefs can wrong people, and the beliefs that wrong people are those 
that diminish their positive agency in the world, then if beliefs can wrong 
God at all, it is reasonable to suspect that the kinds of belief that would 
wrong God would be beliefs that diminish God’s positive agency in the 
world. This is plausible both as an extension of the general reasoning 
about how beliefs can wrong at all, and in light of the idea that we are in 
some sense “created in God’s image.” If we are, indeed, created in God’s 
image, then it should be no wonder that some of the ways in which we can 
be wronged are reflections of ways in which God can be wronged.
So now suppose, just for the sake of discussion, that God sometimes 
works for greater good through natural disasters, famine, or war, and 
consider the case of a single such tragic event, through which God is 
working for the greater good in this way. Let us suppose, without loss 
of generality, that it is a tsunami that kills thousands. As we know from 
many of the most forceful presentations of the problem of evil, it is often 
extremely unobvious what greater good could possibly be achieved 
through the suffering and death of millions. And the reasoning behind 
the problem of evil asks us to conclude, about cases like this one, that in 
fact no greater purpose is served—that these are preventable evils which 
serve no purpose.
And now suppose, as standard presentations of the problem of evil 
encourage, that you believe that the tsunami is a senselessly violent nat-
ural disaster that God could have prevented if He really exists and is 
23Keller, “Friendship and Belief”; Stroud, “Epistemic Partiality in Friendship.”
24Marusic, Evidence and Agency.
25Schroeder, “When Beliefs Wrong.”
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truly omnibenevolent. Under our assumption from the last paragraph, 
this belief is false—as a matter of fact, God is actually working through 
this tsunami in mysterious ways for the greater good (the assumption is 
just for the sake of discussion, recall). But it is not just any false belief—it 
is a false belief that brings God down—it reduces God’s positive agency 
in the world. Indeed, it does so several times over. First, it brings God 
down by taking an act that is actually a very positive one and taking 
it to be a negative one. Second, it brings Them down by taking Them 
to be less active in the world than They really are. And finally, just as 
it hurts particularly much for my wife to take me to have fallen off the 
wagon on the very night that it is my greatest triumph to stay sober 
given adverse circumstances, so also it particularly brings God down to 
take this tsunami to be merely a senseless natural disaster, when in fact 
wringing greater good out of such tragedy is surely one of God’s greater 
achievements.
So, I conclude, if it is possible to wrong God by virtue of our beliefs 
at all, wrongly identifying cases of God’s work for good as exemplars 
of the problem of evil are likely to be leading cases. Now set aside our 
assumption that there are any such cases. Maybe God never works for the 
greater good through apparent tragedies, either because They have no 
master plan, because They do not exist, or for some other reason. Still, the 
fact that beliefs identifying exemplars of the problem of evil would wrong 
God, if these beliefs were false, means that these beliefs have a high cost 
of error, in the same way as beliefs that would wrong our friends, if they 
were false.
But in this paper I have defended the claim that beliefs can wrong 
by defending Pragmatic Intellectualism, according to which the rea-
son that there is no fundamental conflict between epistemic and moral 
norms governing belief is that the risks of wronging someone by what 
you believe about her raise the stakes, and with them, the amount and 
preponderance of evidence required for knowledge or epistemically 
rational belief. So I conclude that if my defense of the possibility of dox-
astic wrongs is on the right track, then if it is possible to wrong God at 
all by what we believe about Them, it must be harder than we might 
have thought to identify test cases for the problem of evil. It is harder, 
because the heightened stakes make it harder to know of any given 
case, such as the tsunami, that it really is an exemplar of the problem of 
evil. And it is harder to know this, even if there are in fact many such 
cases. It is harder to know, simply because of the risk of being wrong, 
just as it is harder to know that the bank will be open on Saturday, even 
if it really is open.
Whether this is enough to show that we do not in fact know of any 
concrete examples that they exemplify the problem of evil is of course 
a further question. Even when the stakes are high, we sometimes know, 
when the evidence is good enough. But on this picture it becomes much 
less obvious that we do.
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8. Consequences for Theism?
The problem of evil is not the only place where the views that I have defended 
in this paper may have further striking consequences. We might also won-
der whether they have consequences for the knowability of Theism, itself.
Pascal’s original wager attempted to argue that we ought to believe in 
God on decision-theoretic grounds. On the standard characterization of 
this decision problem, it assumes that if you believe in God but God does 
not exist, you experience some finite or relatively small costs—time spent 
on prayer and in church or temple, for example. Whereas if you don’t 
believe in God but God does exist, you will experience infinite costs—or at 
least, costs that are completely off-scale with respect to the costs you expe-
rience in the alternative. Consequently, Pascal argued on decision-theo-
retic grounds, you should believe in God.
There are a variety of familiar problems with Pascal’s original wager. For 
one, on its most natural interpretation, it only provides grounds for believ-
ing in a god who would punish non-belief with eternal suffering and/
or reward belief with eternal bliss. And it does not discriminate among 
possible punitive/rewarding gods—if there are both possible omnibe-
nevolent and omnimalevolent gods who would both punish non-belief 
and/or reward belief, the argument supports believing in both. It does no 
good to believe in the bare existential that some god exists, either, because 
that might not be good enough to escape the punishment of the god who 
actually exists.
Another familiar problem with Pascal’s original wager is that it seems 
to show that belief in God is practically rational, but not that it is epistem-
ically rational—rational in the way required for knowledge. And still 
another is that so long as this is not the kind of reasoning that we can 
actually respond to, even once we are convinced by the argument, we can 
only respond to it by taking indirect means to get ourselves to believe—by 
spending more time taking communion, for example, or hanging out with 
our friends who are theists.
But Matthew Benton has argued that views which allow for pragmatic 
encroachment on knowledge or epistemic rationality can bring back a ver-
sion of a Pascalian argument—at least against atheism, if not for theism 
outright.26 Benton’s thought is at least initially promising. If we recon-
struct Pascal’s wager not as an argument for theism, but as an argument 
against atheism, it assumes that there is a high cost associated, not with 
non-belief per se, but rather with false belief. And this is how all familiar 
high stakes cases work in the literature on pragmatic encroachment—in 
all of these cases, there is a high cost of believing something specifically on 
the condition that it is false. So pragmatic encroachment reasoning looks 
at least on the right track to apply to this case.
26Benton, “Pragmatic Encroachment and Theistic Knowledge.” Benton also has an inter-
esting idea about how the argument can be extended to an argument for theism, based on 
some general principles about what he calls “knowability asymmetries.”
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Moreover, if the pragmatic encroachment thesis is true—for example, if 
pragmatic intellectualism is true, as I have argued in the preceding sections 
it is, then when high costs of error raise the standard of evidence required 
for rational belief in some proposition, or to know it, they don’t just make 
it practically or decision-theoretically irrational to hold that belief—they 
make it properly epistemically irrational to hold it in the absence of greater 
evidence. They make it genuinely ineligible for knowledge—something 
that no one that I know of has ever claimed for what Pascal’s wager can 
show about atheism.
Finally, if Pragmatic Intellectualism is true, then if it genuinely applies 
in the case of an argument against atheism, we should not need to employ 
indirect means in order to be convinced by it. Instead, once we under-
stand the greater costs that are at stake, we should find it natural to hold 
out for greater evidence for atheism than we otherwise would, just as we 
naturally do about the proposition that we have no allergy to penicillin or 
negative conclusions about our friends.
Nevertheless, as initially promising as this idea seems, I  don’t think 
either that Benton’s argument as it stands is a successful application of 
Pragmatic Intellectualism or that it would escape the full range of prob-
lems surmounting Pascal’s original wager. The reason that it is not a suc-
cessful application of Pragmatic Intellectualism—and the reason why 
I don’t think it would be a successful application of any defensible prag-
matic encroachment theory—is that Pragmatic Intellectualism is defensible 
in part because it does not allow just any costs of false beliefs to affect the 
stakes, but only the costs that accrue through the belief playing its normal 
functional role. But being rewarded for belief or punished for non-belief is 
not a consequence of it playing its normal role. So if the stakes of the wager 
are supposed to come from the fact that God tots things up at the end of the 
day and rewards theism or inflicts punishment for atheism, then Pragmatic 
Intellectualism does not apply at all, and I would argue, any form of prag-
matic encroachment that does will be indefensible for that very reason.
The only way to fix the argument in order to make Pragmatic 
Intellectualism apply, will therefore be to find a different source for the 
high costs of error. And it is not hard to find ideas that might help. For 
example, suppose that God punishes not atheism, but failure to attend 
church (or that They reward not theism, but church attendance). In that 
case, if being an atheist would lead you not to attend church by reasoning 
out that there is no point in the normal way, the costs of punishment for 
not going to church (or of missing the reward for going to church) would 
indeed render the proposition that God does not exist high stakes by the 
lights of pragmatic intellectualism.
But this just brings out more clearly one of the central problems with 
Pascal’s original wager, which Benton’s “new” Pascalian problem does 
nothing special to evade, which is that it only supports belief in a punitive/
rewarding God, and does not discriminate between, for example, omnibe-
nevolent and omnimalevolent punitive/rewarding Gods. If the revived 
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form of Pascalian argument worked, therefore, it would show not just that 
it is harder to know that God does not exist, but also that it is harder to 
know that God is not omnimalevolent. Indeed, this problem may even get 
extra force, for conditional on the hypothesis that They punish anyone 
who does not attend church with eternal suffering, it is more plausible 
a priori that God is omnimalevolent than that They are omnibenevolent.
9. Sins Against God
For these reasons, when I first considered Benton’s proposed revival of the 
Pascalian argument using the tools of pragmatic encroachment, I believed 
that it could not succeed. But in this paper, I have been interested in prag-
matic encroachment primarily from the perspective of how it helps us to 
make sense of a kind of moral encroachment—primarily from the perspec-
tive of how it allows us to make sense of how beliefs can wrong, and in 
particular, how it could be possible that we could wrong God, by what we 
believe about Them. But now we can flip this path of inquiry on its head. 
If our beliefs themselves can wrong God, then that opens up the possibility 
that a false belief in atheism could wrong God—opening up a quite dif-
ferent path for how to identify the costs of error to those envisioned in the 
last section. On this possibility, we might be able to reconstruct a Pascalian 
argument against atheism not by identifying high costs to us of error, but 
by identifying high moral costs of error.
This path of reconstructing the Pascalian argument does seem much 
more promising. If beliefs that wrong are beliefs that diminish someone’s 
positive agency in the world, then if God does indeed exist and is active in 
the world, no belief could diminish Them more than the belief that They 
do not exist at all.
This, moreover, would solve our problem from the last section about 
whether Pragmatic Intellectualism or any other defensible version of prag-
matic encroachment can be successfully applied to the case of atheism. For 
while being punished for atheism is a kind of incidental cost of false belief—
one that does not stem from it playing its normal functional role in our 
cognitive economy, the wrongfulness of wrongful belief is not a matter of 
what it causes—we saw that if beliefs wrong at all, it is not in virtue of their 
harms—but simply in virtue of being the kind of state that they are.
Another problem for both Pascal’s original argument and for Benton’s 
new Pascalian problem was that in order to derive the costs of error, we 
need to assume that God, if They exist, would be concerned with eternal 
punishments or rewards. Otherwise, eternal punishment for disbelief (or 
failure to obtain eternal reward for belief) is not a consequence of the falsity 
of the belief that God does not exist, at all. Yet even if God does exist, it is 
far from obvious that They are punitive in this way, so this certainly does 
not seem like a safe assumption in the argument. Worse, if we try to solve it 
by restricting the belief in question to the belief that a punitive God does not 
exist, then we run up against the problem that now we have an argument 
that it is not rational to believe that a punitive/rewarding God does not exist 
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but no argument at all that it is not rational to believe that a universalist God 
does not exist. So this now starts to look like the new Pascalian problem is a 
better argument against universalism than it is against atheism.
But again, by appealing to the costs of wrongful belief against God, 
rather than to the high personal costs of damnation, we get an argument 
against atheism that does not require making strong—or unappealing—
assumptions about God’s nature. Indeed, it does not require any assump-
tions about God’s nature at all. If any God exists, and They are active in 
the world in any way, the belief that God does not exist will diminish 
Their positive agency in the world. So this allows the argument to target 
atheism as such, rather than disbelief in any particular conception of God.
Finally, one of the central problems surrounding Pascal’s original argu-
ment is its indiscriminacy. It offers just as good a reason to believe in an 
omnimalevolent deity as in an omnibenevolent one, provided that each is 
assumed to reward belief or punish non-belief. If what I have said here is 
correct, then my new revival of the Pascalian argument against atheism is 
even more indiscriminate—because it requires virtually no assumptions 
about the nature of God, except that if they exist, they are active in the 
world and would be subject to being wronged in similar ways to those in 
which people like you and I can be wronged. But this means that it raises 
the evidence required not only for rational atheism simpliciter, but also the 
evidence required for rational disbelief in any particular god—for exam-
ple, in not just the God of traditional theism, but also in Thor, Jupiter, or 
the Manichean version of Satan.
But notice that whereas it would substantially dampen the ambitions 
of Pascal’s original argument to learn that it supports belief both in the 
traditional Christian God and in Manichean Satan, my proposed revival 
of the Pascalian argument does not aim to tell us what we should believe, 
at all—merely what there are heightened standards for believing. So one 
perfectly reasonable conclusion to draw from this problem is that it is 
not rational to disbelieve in any possible God—and hence that it is not 
rational, either, to have positive beliefs about God that rule out the exist-
ence of other conceptions of God. On this reading, the revived Pascalian 
argument does much to dissuade atheism, but little to lead us toward pos-
itive endorsement of Theism.
But another conclusion is possible, as well. Pragmatic Intellectualism 
does not tell us, after all, that we can’t know atheism to be true—only 
that the evidence that we need in order to know it is great—perhaps sub-
stantially greater—than the evidence required to believe predictions about 
tomorrow’s weather. So even if you accept everything that I have said in 
this paper, you may still think that it is nevertheless rational to believe that 
God does not exist—because the evidence is simply so good. Similarly, 
you may accept everything that I have said here and think that it is not 
rational to believe that God does not exist, but that it is rational to dis-
believe in Thor and the Manichean Satan—because the evidence against 
them is at least good enough.
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Or, of course, you could take all of this as a thoroughgoing argument 
for agnosticism. Neither Pragmatic Intellectualism nor the additional pos-
sibility that we can wrong God—if They exist!—by our beliefs about Them 
can settle this question. The framework that I have been exploring in this 
paper is therefore, in that sense, ecumenical.
10. Wrapping Up
In this paper I have been exploring the idea that we could potentially 
wrong God directly in virtue of what we believe, as an extension of the 
idea that we could commit doxastic wrongs against other persons. Far 
from being an extreme or bizarre view, I have been endeavoring to sug-
gest that the view that we could is entirely natural. Indeed, I now want 
to suggest, in closing, that insofar as we are able to wrong others by what 
we believe about them at all, if we are in any plausible sense created in 
God’s image, it must be possible to wrong God by what we believe.
The reason for this is simple. The beliefs that wrong us are beliefs that 
diminish our positive agency in the world. But beliefs formed about the 
weather, or about the eruptions of Mt. Kilauea, do not wrong the weather, 
and do not wrong Mt. Kilauea, when they are formed under analogous 
circumstances. The relevant difference, I believe, is that we are persons, 
and the weather and Mt. Kilauea are not. There is something about being 
a person that makes beliefs that diminish your positive agency in the world 
wrong you, when analogous beliefs do not wrong other kinds of thing.
I believe that this is because of the kind of thing that persons are.27 But 
whether that diagnosis is correct or not, the underlying fact remains, that 
beliefs wrong us and not the weather or Mt. Kilauea. It is a consequence 
of this fact that to the extent that God resembles us and not the weather 
or Mt. Kilauea, we should expect similar beliefs to wrong God. So what 
I suggest, is that to the extent that you believe that we are created in God’s 
image, you should expect that God resembles us, in relevant respects, 
more than They resemble the weather or Mt. Kilauea. So it should not be 
surprising if the same sorts of beliefs that wrong us, also wrong God.
If what I have been suggesting in this paper is on the right track, then, 
it follows not only that one of the ways in which we have at least the 
potential to sin against God in thought, as well as in word and deed, lies in 
virtue of holding beliefs that directly wrong Them, but that this fact itself 
bears striking consequences for the epistemology of Theism itself, as well 
as for the problem of evil.28
 University of Southern California
27Schroeder, “Persons as Things.”
28Special thanks to Mark Murphy, Rima Basu, Mike Ashfield, Steve Bero, and the partic-
ipants in the Third Annual Theistic Ethics Workshop at which a version of the thoughts in 
this paper were originally presented, particularly including Christian Miller, Mark Murphy, 
Chris Tucker, Alan Goldman, Rebecca Stangl, and many others.
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